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COMMENTS

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AFTER
ROBERTS V. UNITED STATES JAYCEES
.Douglas 0. Linder*

The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 1 upholding a Minnesota ruling which requires the
Minnesota Jaycees to admit women as full members, ended one controversy but marked only the beginning of a far larger one. It was
predicted by many that U.S. Jaycees would answer the question of
whether private associations with restrictive membership policies
were vulnerable to state anti-discrimination laws or were constitutionally protected. It did not. Instead, while rejecting the Jaycees'
constitutional claims, the Court established a comprehensive framework for analyzing future claims of associational freedom that contains a number of subjective elements inviting litigation. In view of
the significance of the U.S. Jaycees analysis to a wide range of cases
involving private associations, the case can fairly be called "a
lan<Jmark." It is, however, less a "landmark" in the sense of marking a turning point in the development of the law than in the sense of
being a point of orientation. The principal purpose of this Article is
to explore the implications of ll.S Jaycees for other associations with
restrictive membership policies, and to propose ways to reduce some
of the uncertainty engendered by the decision.
The Jaycees' road to the Supreme Court began in 1974 when the
Minneapolis chapter of the nonprofit organization, in defiance of the
national organization's bylaws which limit membership to young
men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five,2 began admitting
women as regular members.3 The St. Paul chapter followed suit the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City. J.D. 1976, Stanford
University. - Ed.
I. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
2. Article 4-2 of the bylaws establishes the following requirement for regular membership:
Young men between the ages of eighteen (18) and thirty-five (35), inclusive, of Local
Organization Members in good standing in this Corporation shall be considered Individual Members of this Corporation (unless the ages for membership shall have been
changed by the State Organization Member as hereinafter permitted by By-Law 4-4.A.).
United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1562 (8th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted), revd
sub nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
3. 104 S. Ct. at 3247.
1878

August 1984]

Freedom of Association

1879

next year. In December 1978, when the president of the national
organization advised the two chapters that a motion to revoke their
charters would soon be considered, members of both chapters filed
charges of sex discrimination with the Minnesota Department of
Human Rights. 4
The complaints alleged that the Jaycees' policy of excluding
women violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which provides
in part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a
place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion,
disability, national origin, or sex.5
In 1979, a Department hearing examiner concluded that the Jaycees

was "a place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the
Act and that the organization's exclusion of women as regular members constituted an "unfair discriminatory practice." 6 The Jaycees
were ordered to desist from imposing any sanctions on any Minnesota affiliates for admitting women. 7 A subsequent Minnesota
Supreme Court decision agreed with the examiner's conclusion that
the Jaycees was "a place of public accommodation." 8
Meanwhile, the national organization had filed suit in federal
court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Minnesota Human Rights
Act. The Jaycees allege.d that application of the Act would violate
the organization's constitutional rights of free speech and association.9 After trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the
state officials, 10 but that decision was overturned by a divided Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 11 The court of appeals found that
application of the statute to the Jaycees would be "a direct and substantial" interference with the organization's right to select its members guaranteed by the first amendment, and that the state's interest
4. 104 S. Ct. at 3248.
5. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982).
6. Minnesota v. United States Jaycees, No. HR-790-014-GB (Minn. Office of Hearing Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, Oct. 9, 1979), reprinted in Appellants' Jurisdictional
Statement at A-93 - A-130, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (mem.)
[hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Statement].
7. Minnesota v. United States Jaycees, No. HR-790-01G-6B, reprinted in Jurisdictional
Statement at A-108.
8. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
9. 104 S. Ct. at 3248.
10. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1982), revd, 709 F.2d
1560 (8th Cir. 1983), revd sub nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
11. 709 F.2d 1560.
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in eliminating discrimination was not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference. 12 The national organization subsequently
revoked the charter of the St. Paul chapter. 13
Minnesota's appeal was considered by only seven members of the
U.S. Supreme Court. 14 (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
did not participate. Burger was chapter president of the St. Paul
Jaycees in 1935, while Blackmun is a former member of the Minneapolis Jaycees. 15) Justice Brennan wrote an opinion for the Court
which reversed the Eighth Circuit. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.
There was, to the suprise of many, no dissent.

I.

THE TENSION BETWEEN ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM AND
EQUALITY

In conflict in U.S. Jaycees were two well-established American
principles: associational freedom and equality. It is a conflict the
Supreme Court has seen before in other contexts. In cases involving
challenges to the application of anti-discrimination legislation in the
areas of housing, 16 employment, 17 education, 18 and access to commercial establishments, 19 the Court has consistently rejected claims
of an associational freedom to discriminate. Indeed, as the ACLU
points out in its amicus brief filed in the U.S. Jaycees case, "an unbounded freedom to dis-associate would cripple the guarantees of
equality contained in the Constitution and our Civil Rights statutes,
since every ban on discrimination would be checkmated by an assertion of individual autonomy phrased as a claim of associational
freedom." 20
It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the Court's disposition of earlier cases involving claims of associational freedom
made U.S. Jaycees an easy case. Two facts made it a very hard case.
First, the societal interest in equality is less strongly implicated in the
12. 709 F.2d at 1572.
13. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, July 4, 1984, at I IA, col. 1.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 3257.
15. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, July 4, 1984, at IOA, col. 4.
16. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984); Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326
U.S. 88 (1945).
18. Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
19. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Assn., 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
20. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union at 12, Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
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denial of the intangible benefits of membership in a voluntary association than in previous cases involving the denial of employment,
education and housing. Second, the associational freedom at stake,
the right of an association to define its own membership, is fundamental to a conception of a pluralistic free society.21 Widespread
recognition of the relative strength of the associational interest at
stake is suggested by the fact that until recently virtually all antidiscrimination legislation either has contained, or has been interpreted to contain, exceptions for private associations. 22 Only in the
past few years has the push for racial and sexual equality been sufficiently strong to thrust states into this sphere of human activity.
Even today, most state anti-discrimination laws continue to exempt
the membership practices of private associations from governmental
intrusion,23 and some of those states (such as Minnesota) which have
extended their laws to reach private associations have done so with
great trepidation. 24
The tension between associational freedom and equality is one
aspect of the larger tension between egalitarian, rights-oriented liberalism and communitarianism. Rights-oriented liberalism assumes
that each individual has a personal set of interests and goals. It seeks
a neutral legal framework which assures each individual an equal
opportunity to pursue interests and goals as free moral agents. Because a person's worth is measured not by his attachments but rather
by the choices he makes, the expansion of individual rights, through
such means as state anti-discrimination statutes, is regarded as un21. The Jaycees in their brief contended that "[flew cases in this Court's history have so
deeply involved the shape and character of the private sector." Brief of Appellee United States
Jaycees at 49, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Appellee's Brief]. Judge Arnold, writing for the Eighth Circuit, also was convinced that the
associational interest involved was a strong one: "This kind of assertion of state power . . .
goes to the heart of the kind of association that plaintiff has had and desires to continue . . . ."
709 F.2d at 1571.
22. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts from its public accommodation sections all clubs
and similar institutions "not in fact open to the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (Title II) (1982).
For discussion of an attempt to apply the Civil Rights Act to a private association, see, e.g.,
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974). As for
the states, it was reported in 1970 that each of the 37 states which had enacted public accommodation statutes "exempted private clubs either specifically or through restricted definitions
of public accommodations." Comment, .Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of
Association and Right of Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1182 (footnotes omitted). Most attempts to apply public accommodation statutes to private associations have failed. See, e.g.,
Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 275 Or. 327, 551 P.2d 465 (1976).
23. But see note 97 infra.
24. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1981) (limiting the application of the law to "public" organizations - like the Jaycees - but not to "private" organizations - like the Kiwanis). Three justices on the Minnesota Supreme Court
dissented from the holding that the Jaycees was a "public accommodation" within the meaning of the statute. 305 N.W.2d at 774.
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qualified moral and political progress.25
On the other hand, the communitarian sees a cost in egalitarianism. To the communitarian, an individual's source of identity comes
not so much from individual choices as from the communities of
which the individual is a part - family, church, trade union, social
club, political party, city or nation. Communitarians worry that anything which erodes intermediate forms of community, such as antidiscrimination legislation, concentrates power in the state, and at the
same time reduces the vitality and diversity of public life. 26 The
rights-oriented liberal is likely to respond that the communitarian
view, with its emphasis on preserving the traditions and obligations
of intermediate communities, is a virtual invitation to prejudice.
The controversy presented in U.S. Jaycees provided the Court
with an opportunity to address in a fundamental way the tension
between associational freedom and equality - the tension between
the communitarian and liberal views of the world. To its credit, the
Court demonstrated its appreciation of the competing values and
ethics involved.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court identified the concern
that lies at the heart of the communitarian ethic. He wrote, "certain
kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals
and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the State."27 Brennan was
writing about personal relationships (especially the family), but his
observation has validity as well when applied to somewhat less personal, larger associations such as churches and political parties. At
another point in his opinion, Brennan notes that some form of legal
protection might be necessary to preserve societal benefits derived
from private associations: "According protection to collective effort
on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from
suppression by the majority." 28 Clearly, this is not a Court ready to
permit an obsessive legislative concern for equality to accomplish
unwittingly the destruction of the private associations which enrich
public life. Moreover, as another passage makes clear, Brennan rec25. For a penetrating exposition of egalitarian, rights-oriented liberalism, see J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

26. For discussions of co=unitarianism and critiques of liberalism, see, e.g., M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) or A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).
27. 104 S. Ct. at 3250.
28. 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
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ognizes that the associational freedom involved in U.S. Jaycees is no
minor matter: "There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into
the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire." 29
As one would expect from a justice who has consistently demonstrated his credentials as an egalitarian, rights-oriented liberal, Brennan also fully understands, and stresses in his opinion, the
importance of equality in access to opportunities. He describes Minnesota's goal of "assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services" as a compelling state interest "of the
highest order."30 Brennan offers two justifications, one intrinsic and
one instrumental, for valuing equality so highly. Discrimination, he
says, "deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural
life."31
A confrontation between egalitarian and communitarian values,
such as that posed in U.S. Jaycees, might have been expected to produce a sharply divided court. Liberal justices could be predicted to
vote to uphold the anti-discrimination statute, whereas conservatives
on the Court, who generally share communitarian views, might be
predicted to be sympathetic to the Jaycees' position. There was no
sharp division on the Court, however; the case was decided without a
dissenting vote. Justice O'Connor's complaint in a concurring opinion that the test adopted by the majority was "both over-protective
of activities undeserving of constitutional shelter and under-protective of important First Amendment concerns" is the only indication
of disagreement.3 2
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, a court in which dissent is
a rarity,33 split sharply in U.S. Jaycees. A petition to rehear en bane
the split decision of a three-judge panel upholding the Jaycees' constitutional claim was denied by an equally divided vote.34 How did
a case which provoked such disagreement on the court of appeals
produce a unanimous decision in the Supreme Court? The answer
may lie in the Supreme Court's unique ability to simultaneously an29. 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
30. 104 S. Ct. at 32S3.
31. 104 S. Ct. at 3253.
32. 104 S. Ct. at 32S7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See text at notes 86-94 infra.
33. Between January 1, 1982 and June 30, 1984, dissenting opinions were filed in only 6.7%
of the reported panel decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. D. Linder, Dissent in
the Eighth. Circuit: A Study of Judges and Judging (uncompleted manuscript).
34. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing en bane (Aug. 1, 1983), reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 6, at 131 app.
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nounce and severely circumscribe a constitutional principle. It is the
Supreme Court which is the principal expositor of constitutional law,
and that role sometimes presents opportunities for compromise in
the Court which are not open to courts which primarily decide constitutional cases, not make constitutional law. Whether the limiting
language in Justice Brennan's opinion was bought with the votes
necessary to forge a majority opinion is a matter of pure speculation.35 Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that under the test
propounded by the Court, it is likely in many future cases where
U.S. Jaycees is the most significant precedent that the balancing of
associational freedom and equality will produce an opposite result.

II.

THE ANALYSIS IN

ll.S.

JAYCEES

Justice Brennan identifies two distinct constitutional sources of
protection for associational freedom: the first amendment (implicit
in the right to engage in expressive activities) and the fourteenth
amendment (as a fundamental aspect of privacy).36 Brennan refers
to the first amendment justification for protecting association as "instrumental"; the due process clause justification he refers to as "intrinsic."37 While the existence of the two separate sources of
protection was understood by some of the lawyers participating in
the U.S. Jaycees litigation, it is remarkable how rarely the basic distinction appeared in briefs and other litigation documents. The most
charitable explanation for the omission is that one of the two sources
of protection - the zone of privacy found to exist in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment - was seen as offering so little
hope of protecting the membership policies of a 295,000-member organization that it did not warrant discussion. 38 Justice O'Connor
agrees with that assessment in her concurring opinion.39
Although the less relevant of the two senses of "freedom of association" to the Jaycees' litigation, the scope of protection afforded by
the due process clause for "certain intimate human relationships" 40
35. For speculation that it was, see Will, Jaycees: Consorting With the Ladies?, Detroit
News, July 8, 1984, at 13-A, col 4.
36. 104 S. Ct. at 3249.
37. 104 S. Ct. at 3249.
38. For further discussion of the right of privacy as a source for protection of associational
freedom, see, e.g., Karst, Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Comment,
,Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Righi to Privacy, 1970
DUKE LJ. 1181; Comment, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Con•
flict, 5 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 460 (1970).
39. 104 S. Ct. at 3257 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
40. 104 S. Ct. at 3249.
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has important implications for other private associations with discriminatory membership policies. Brennan identifies as falling
under the constitutional shelter of the fourteenth amendment those
associations which involve "deep attachments and commitments" of
an intensely personal sort - associations in which are shared not
only ideas and experiences, but also the "distinctly personal aspects
of one's life."41 Obviously, the association at the very center of
Brennan's conception of protected associations is the family.
Supreme Court decisions which have protected associational freedom as an intrinsic element of personal liberty have generally done
so in situtations where the state has intruded upon personal decisions
bearing critically on family lives - marriage,42 childbirth,43 the rearing and education of children,44 and cohabitation with one's
relatives.45
If the protection afforded associational freedom by the due process clause were specifically limited to family relationships, it would
hardly deserve the attention received in Brennan's opinion. Privacy
protection, although having its strongest force in situations involving
governmental intrusion into family decisions, reaches other relationships which share the characteristics that make family life deserving
of protection. Brennan lists some of these characteristics. They include "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to
begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." 46 In the next paragraph, Brennan
adds the purpose and policies of the association, as well as "congeniality," to the list of factors relevant to a determination of whether
constitutional protection of "intrinsic" associational freedom is
appropriate.47
Brennan declines to identify associations other than the family
which may meet his standards for privacy protection, although he
seems to suggest a sliding scale of protection for associations ranging
from the family, which will be protected from a wide variety of state
incursions, to associations in which personal attachments are highly
attenuated (such as General Motors or the Jaycees), and for which
41. 104 S. Ct. at 3250.
42. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
43. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
44. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
45. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46. 104 S. Ct. at 3250.
47. 104 S. Ct. at 3251.
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no privacy protection is available. 48 Located between the family and
General Motors on Brennan's spectrum are a great number of associations with privacy claims of varying strengths.
It will be for future cases to flesh out the implications of the intrinsic sense of associational freedom, but some private associations
have a number of characteristics listed in U.S. Jaycees, and therefore
apparently have relatively strong privacy claims. A four-couple
bridge club or a college fraternity or sorority, for example, may satisfy Brennan's criteria of relative smallness, selectivity, seclusion and
congeniality. To the extent these associations' "purposes" might include sharing "personal aspects of one's life," the match would be
fairly complete. Presumably then, an interference with such an association might be vulnerable to constitutional attack. For example, a
state university regulation prohibiting single-sex organizations
would be constitutionally suspect as applied to college fraternities or
sororities. State regulation of private bridge clubs, although a wildly
implausible prospect, probably would be of even more dubious constitutionality. But whether the fourteenth amendment's zone of privacy would afford protection for large-membership, single-sex social
organizations, such as the Elks or Moose, is open to serious
question.49
Putting to a side the constitutional underpinnings of the fourteenth amendment's zone of privacy, judicial willingness to protect
highly personal relationships is easily understood. The explanation
lies in the weakness of the asserted state justification for regulation.
With the exception of Roe v. Wade 50 and its progeny, virtually all of
48. 104 S. Ct. at 3250-5 I.
49. Prior to U.S. Jaycees, the Supreme Court had not considered the attempt of a state to
directly regulate the membership of a private association. The issue had been discussed, however, in various concurring and dissenting opinions. For example, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Douglas (in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)), stated:
My view of the First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights is that
they create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering with private
clubs or groups. The associational nghts which our system honors permit all white, all
black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all
Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman
who his or her associates must be.
407 U.S. at 179-80.
The issue was also discussed in the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg,joined by Warren, CJ., and Douglas, J., in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964):
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every
person to close his home or club to any person or to choose his social intimates and
business partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race. These and
other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves constitutionally
protected liberties.
378 U.S. at 313.
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protection of fetal life).
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the Court's decisions recognizing a constitutionally protected zone of
privacy are cases where the state's interest was remarkably weak.51
The probability of judicial protection of private discrimination, as
well as the improbability of state regulation, increases when the association in question has the characteristics identified by Brennan primarily because the public consequences of the private discrimination
become ever more attenuated. The decision of the Elm Street Saturday Night Poker Club not to admit black members, although perhaps morally reprehensible, hardly threatens significant state
interests.
The Jaycees' claim under the first amendment was taken considerably more seriously than its privacy claim. It is in its discussion of
associational freedom as an implicitly protected first amendment
right that the greater significance of U.S. Jaycees lies. It is also this
discussion which spurred a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor
identifying serious problems with the majority's approach.
Although the word "association" appears nowhere in the first
amendment52 (or anywhere else in the Constitution), a right to associate has long been recognized as necessary to safeguard those activities specifically protected by the first amendment - religion, speech,
assembly, petition for grievances.53 Obviously, neither political parties nor organized religion could flourish without association.
Of the many possible forms governmental interference with free
association may take, one of the most troublesome is interference
with the internal organization or affairs of a group. The Court has in
the past not hesitated to invalidate interference of this type. 54 It is
precisely this type of interference at issue in U.S. Jaycees. Justice
Brennan appreciates the serious intrusion presented by a regulation
which forces an organization such as the Jaycees to accept members
it does not desire: "Such a regulation may impair the ability of the
original members to express only those views that brought them to51. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,500 (1977) (ordinance which
would prevent grandmother from living with grandsons justified by city as means of preventing overcrowding and parking congestion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(claim of a married couple of a privacy right to use birth control was upheld against a state
claim that it could restrict the use of contraceptives by all residents, including married persons,
as a means of discouraging promiscuity); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (privacy
right of parents to direct the education of their children was upheld against a claim by Nebraska that it could prohibit the teaching of German in nonpublic schools as a means of promoting the "Americanization" of young children).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State
Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
54. See, e.g., Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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gether."55 Justice O'Connor sees the threat to first amendment values as even larger. She writes, "Protection of the association's right
to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the
selection of members is the definition of that voice."56 According to
O'Connor, any state interference with the membership policies of an
expressive association "violates the most basic guarantee of the First
Amendment - that citizens, not the government, control the content
of public discussion." 57
The approaches to defining a first amendment associational freedom proposed by Justices Brennan and O'Connor differ substantially both in their focus and in their implications for other
associations with restrictive membership policies. In one important
respect they agree: both are capable of affording meaningful protection for associational freedom. Either approach could be considered
a rejection of a basic argument made by Minnesota and others in
support of enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. They had argued that acts of discrimination could not be considered "pure expression," and therefore that a law prohibiting the exclusion of an
identified class from an association should be subjected only to the
balancing test adopted by the Court in United States v. O'Brien. 58
Under the O'Brien test, the existence of an important state interest
unrelated to the suppression of speech should be sufficient to sustain
the statute.59 Whether·the Brennan or the O'Connor analysis is used
in future cases, states seeking to interfere with the restrictive membership practices of expressive associations will have to show more
than merely an "important" interest.
The critical difference between the approaches of Brennan and
O'Connor can be summarized easily. Brennan would balance an association's claim, no matter how strong it might be, against the interest supporting the state intrusion.60 O'Connor, on the other hand,
would uphold an association's claim against a state anti-discrimination statute once she was assured that the association qualified as an
"expressive association."61 The other major difference relates to the
55. 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
56. 104 S. Ct. at 3258 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. 104 S. Ct. at 3258 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For Minnesota's argument that it need not show that its statute is
supported by a compelling state interest, see Appellant's Brief at 15-22, Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
59. 391 U.S. at 376-77.
60. 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
61. 104 S. Ct. at 3258 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

August 1984]

Freedom of Association

1889

factors relevant to each Justice's analysis. For Brennan, a number of
factors must be weighed. 62 For O'Connor, the analysis is more
straightforward, focusing almost exclusively on whether the activities
of the association are predominantly expressive or commercial. 63
Thus in the case of the Jaycees, an organization which falls on the
"commercial" side of O'Connor's dichotomy, the first amendment
claim fails. Conversely, Brennan and the majority see a first amendment right of the Jaycees as "plainly implicated,"64 but the Jaycees
lose on the balancing test. The involvement of the Jaycees in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, and fundraising activities is enough
to trigger Brennan's first amendment analysis; O'Connor demands
more.
Brennan invokes a test which has seen wide application in first
amendment case law. The Minnesota anti-discrimination law may
be applied to the Jaycees if it serves a "compelling state interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." 65
What is noteworthy about Brennan's test in U.S. Jaycees is that
while the formulation may be the same as in other first amendment
contexts, the test as applied seems substantially less speech-protective than in previous cases.66
The two significant inquiries in U.S. Jaycees concern the strength
of Minnesota's interest in applying its anti-discrimination statute to
the Jaycees and whether enforcement of the statute represents the
least restrictive means of achieving those interests. No serious contention is made that the Minnesota Act is aimed at the suppression
of speech, and Brennan dismisses the suggestion that discriminatory
membership policies are themselves "symbolic speech" deserving of
first amendment protection.67
With few exceptions, insistence that a state demonstrate a com62. 104 S. Ct. at 3250-51. The factors to be weighed would include the degree to which the
exclusion from membership adversely affects the excluded class and the interests of the state,
the degree to which the adverse impact of the restrictive membership policy on state interests
could be reduced through measures open to the state, the degree to which application of the
anti-discrimination law to the association's membership policies would affect the expressive
activities of the association, and the degree to which the membership policies of the association
are selective. Each of these factors is considered in greater detail in the text which follows.
63. 104 S. Ct. at 3259 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
65. 104 S. Ct. at 3252.
66. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Nebraska Press Assn.
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
67. Justice Brennan characterizes any claim that the admission of women as full voting
members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are prohibited
from voting as "attenuated at best." 104 S. Ct. at 3255.
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pelling state interest to support a regulation has in the past meant
that the regulation could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Only
for Justice Powell has "compelling" sometimes not seemed to mean
"compelling."68 Nonetheless, in U.S. Jaycees five justices of the
Supreme Court are convinced that Minnesota has a compelling interest in seeing to it that women may become full members of the
Jaycees. In particular, Brennan says that the state's compelling interest lies in "[a]ssuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and advantages" as the Jaycees may have to offer its
members.69 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in holding the public
accommodation law applicable to the Jaycees, found that,
~'[l]eadership skills are 'goods', [and] business contacts and employment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages.' " 70 Brennan accepted Minnesota's conclusion that valuable goods and privileges
could come from membership in the Jaycees.
Brennan's focus on state interests poses serious analytical
problems. For example, Brennan seems to require a determination
as to whether guaranteeing equal access to the particular organization challenging the statute serves a compelling interest. If the
Jaycees promised to develop the leadership skills of their members,
but failed to deliver, presumably no compelling state interest would
be served by ensuring access to women, and the organization's constitutional claim would be upheld. Well-run organizations would
appear to be vulnerable to anti-discrimination laws; poorly run organizations appear safe. Moreover, by stressing the goods and services of the Jaycees and their economic importance to women,
Brennan also raises questions about the status of an all-male or allfemale organization which is only one of several organizations to
offer a particular set of goods or services. What if there were an allfemale organization in the Twin Cities, or one open to both sexes,
which was as well-connected in the business world as the Jaycees
and which offered the same leadership training and other privileges
that the Court viewed as so beneficial to women? Is it really of
"compelling" importance that each sex have equal access to every
organization offering valuable privileges? 71
68. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355-79 (1978), in which
Justice Powell found the state university's interest in a diverse student body to be compelling
enough to justify preferential treatment in admissions for minority students.
69. 104 S. Ct. at 3254.
70. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1981).
71. Judge Arnold, writing for the Eighth Circuit, was much less willing to accept Minnesota's asserted interest at face value. Arnold pointed out that the record failed to demonstrate
"that membership in the Jaycees was the only practicable way for a woman to advance herself
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Brennan's opinion might have presented fewer analytical
problems if the state interest had been described in a more general
way: ensuring all persons equal access to the goods and privileges
that come with membership in private associations.72 Surely, however, Brennan recognized that labelling that interest "compelling"
would allow states to apply their anti-discrimination laws to every
association from the Girl Scouts to the Moose to the Sons of Norway. Such a proposition plainly could not command the support of
a majority on the Court.
A more helpful description of the state interest involved in U.S.
Jaycees might have adopted the distinction made by Justice
O'Connor between predominantly commercial and predominantly
expressive organizations. States could be regarded to have a compelling interest in ensuring equal access to associations which have
"enter[ed] the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree."73 On the other hand, a state would not have a compelling
interest in ensuring access to associations predominantly engaged in
expressive activities, such as churches, political parties, or the Sons
of Norway. Had Brennan identified the state interest in terms of the
commercial-expressive dichotomy, major differences between the
majority opinion and O'Connor's concurring opinion would have
been avoided. 74
Nonetheless, other problems with the Brennan analysis remain.
Most significantly, if Minnesota's interest in the anti-discrimination
statute truly were compelling and if, as Brennan concludes, the statute represents the means of achieving its objective least restrictive of
first amendment freedoms,75 what is the point in an extended discusin business or professional life." He noted that Minnesota did not prove that there was not
available to women "similar organizational el'.(perience in other clubs or associations" which
could have been of"similar or greater help." 709 F. 2d at 1573. According to the Jaycees, the
all-female Minneapolis Junior League, confined to women under 40, "has been a potent force
in the community for decades, far surpassing the Jaycees in [influence]." Brief for Appellees,
supra note 22, at 32.
72. It is at least plausible to assume that society benefits whenever the informative experiences - be they social, political, or otherwise - of its citizens involve interaction with
members of the opposite sex. Arguably, the more common experiences are had by people of
opposite sexes, the less likely it is that either sex will be the victim of sexual stereotyping.
73. 104 S. Ct. at 3259 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. There is one difficulty with identifying Minnesota's compelling interest as ensuring
equal access to commercial associations. It is not at all obvious that equality of access to
expressive associations may not be just as important. Are the benefits of membership in the
Boy Scouts (predominantly expressive) less important than the benefits of membership in the
Jaycees (predominantly commercial)?
75. Judge Arnold in his opinion below found that Minnesota failed to use the least restrictive means of accomplishing its goal. Specifically, Arnold suggested that state employees could
be instructed not to join the Jaycees, state tax concessions could be withdrawn, and employer
contributions to the Jaycees could be prohibited. 709 F.2d at 1573. It was suggested in an
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sion of whether the expressive activities of the Jaycees will be affected by the admission of women as full members? A
determination that the statute was supported by a compelling interest and employed least restrictive means should end the matter. Apparently, Justice Brennan felt compelled to make the wholly
implausible argument that not only did application of the Minnesota
statute represent the least restrictive means of ensuring equal access
to the Jaycees' goods and privileges, but that it presented no serious
burden at afl 76
Brennan disputes the finding of the Eighth Circuit that the admission of women members to the Jaycees is likely to cause "some
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast."77 A suggestion that the
admission of blacks to the Ku Klux Klan would not change the organization's philosophical cast would be laughable. One need not
engage in racial stereotyping to predict that blacks would tend to
have different views on racial issues than would most K.K.K. members.78 The impact on the expressive activities of the Jaycees resulting from the admission of women would be far less dramatic, but no
less certain.
Justice Brennan observes that most of the positions taken by the
Jaycees over the years have nothing to do with sex. 79 Unfortunately,
the fact that Brennan chose to stress that point suggests that the
Jaycees might have won their case if only they had taken a strong
position against the Equal Rights Amendment. Should the degree to
which an organization has involved itself with women's issues determine whether it can gain constitutional protection for its exclusion of
women? Justice O'Connor is correct in her conclusion that
"[w]hether an association is or is not constitutionally protected in the
amicus brief that Arnold's analysis "ignores the Minnesota legislature's implicit determination
that nothing works to end discrimination in public accommodation like banning discrimination in public accommodations." Brief for Community Business Leaders as Amicus Curiae at
13, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
76. 104 S. Ct. at 3254-55.
77. 709 F.2d at 1571.
78. This is almost certainly true, although admittedly blacks who would choose to join the
K.K.K. may not reflect the views of most blacks. Many reasons could be hypothesized for
blacks joining the K.K.K., the most plausible of which might be the belief that by so doing, the
organization could be destroyed.
The effect that state regulation of the internal rules of an association may have on the
ideology of that association is also exemplified in state "open primary" laws. These laws have
allowed Republicans to vote in Democratic primaries - and vice versa. The election results in
open primaries might be perceived as better or worse than those that would have occurred in a
closed primary, but they are certainly different. On several occasions, members of one party
have voted in an opposition primary with the express purpose of helping to nominate the most
beatable candidate.
79. 104 S. Ct. at 3255.
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selection of its membership should not depend on what the association says or why its members say it." 80
Moreover, the majority is wrong to dismiss the possibility that
the admission of women would affect the content of the Jaycees'
speech activities as based "solely on unsupported generalizations
about the relative interests and perspectives of men and women" and
on "sexual stereotyping." 81 Perhaps the example which best illustrates the majority's error is made in the Jaycees' brief:
The basic issue in this case [ U.S. Jaycees] has been litigated by the
Jaycees in numerous courts over the past decade at considerable expense; the presence of women voting members and officers would
clearly have hindered the Jaycees' ability to devote its resources to this
constitutionally protected advocacy.82

More generally, however, the prediction that the votes of female
Jaycees members will not, in all cases, reflect the votes of male members is not merely "sexual stereotyping." Whether an excluded class
be members of an occupational group, a geographic region, race,
religion, or sex, that common characteristic shared by members of
that class will at least in small measure affect the perspective of
group members. The experiences of women in American society today, as a group, differ in significant ways from the experiences of
men as a group. Polling results support the prediction that gender
does indeed correlate with certain attitudes toward issues ranging
from abortion to war and peace. 83
The significance to the majority's analysis of the membershipmessage connection is somewhat unclear. Justice O'Connor interprets the majority opinion to condition first amendment protection
on the organization's "making a 'substantial' showing that the admission of unwelcome members 'will change the message communicated by the group's speech.' " 84 Maybe. The majority only
obliquely addresses the issue. Had the Jaycees made the "far more
substantial" showing that admission of women would change the
content of the organization's speech, Brennan suggests that he still
may have found the statute's effect to be "no greater than is neces80. 104 S. Ct. at 3258 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. 104 S. Ct. at 3255. In observing that these "[unsupported] generalizations may or may
not have a statistical basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by the Jaycees,"
Brennan seems to concede the possibility that the views of women and men, as groups, may
sometimes diverge. But Brennan refuses to "rel[y) uncritically on such assumptions . . . [i)n
the absence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted by the Jaycees." 104 S. Ct.
at 3255.
82. Appellee's Brief, supra note 21, at 21.
83. Id
84. 104 S. Ct. at 3257 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sary to accomplish the State's legitimate purposes." 85
O'Connor's analysis has the distinct advantage of making the
whole matter of a membership-message connection irrelevant. At
the same time, her approach avoids creating any incentive for an
association to take positions opposite to those thought to be favored
by a group excluded from membership. For O'Connor, the critical
inquiry was straightforward, though not necessarily clearcut: are the
Jaycees a "commercial association" or an "expressive association"?

Ill.

THE COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION -

EXPRESSIVE

ASSOCIATION DICHOTOMY

Justice O'Connor would divide all associations into two groups:
commercial associations and expressive associations. Only "minimal" constitutional protection would be given to the freedom of
commercial association. 86 For expressive associations, on the other
hand, the first amendment would "give substance to the ideal of
complete protection." 87 Under the O'Connor view of "all or nothing" protection for association, which side of the expressive-commercial line an association falls on is the question of central importance.
O'Connor recognizes that associations can be placed along a
spectrum running from the purely expressive at one pole to the
purely commercial at the other. She readily admits that few associations occupy either pole. Even a predominantly expressive association, such as the Republican Party, the American Lutheran Church
or Common Cause, is likely to engage in many nonexpressive activities. There are dues to be collected, office equipment to be
purchased, coffee to be served and halls to be rented. It is equally
true that a predominantly commercial association, such as General
Motors, the United Auto Workers, or the National Association of
Broadcasters, will engage in some incidental protected speech, such
as advertising or lobbying. The result, as O'Connor admits, is that
the standard for determining which associations have a first amendment right to control their membership cannot be "articulated with
simple precision."BB
Justice O'Connor's standard for distinguishing between expres85. 104 S. Ct. at 3255.
86. 104 S. Ct. at 3258 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor recognizes, of course, that
commercial speech is entitled to a substantial degree of constitutional protection, but she notes
that a state would be free "to impose any rational regulation on the commercial transaction
itself." For example, "[a] shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with persons of
one sex." 104 S. Ct. at 3258.
87. 104 S. Ct. at 3259 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. 104 S. Ct. at 3259.
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sive and commercial associations certainly is no model of "simple
precision" - or precision of any sort. Twice in her opinion
O'Connor suggests that classification of an association will tum on
whether or not the association's activities are "predominantly" expressive.89 Apparently classification would therefore require looking
at all of an association's activities and determining whether more
than half of the association's efforts were devoted to commercial activities such as recruitment and collection of dues, or whether "expressive" activities such as ritual, worship, debate, or lobbying
occupied most of the members' time. At another point in her opinion, however, O'Connor suggests that even a predominance of expressive activities may not save an association from the label
"commercial." O'Connor states that once an association "enters the
marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it
confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas." 90 The Jaycees,
whose national officers devote over eighty percent of their time to
recruitment,91 may well be "commercial" under either formulation
of the standard.92 For other organizations, such as the Kiwanis or
Rotary, the question of which formulation is chosen could determine
whether their single-sex membership policies will receive constitutional protection.
89. 104 S. Ct. at 3259.
90. 104 S. Ct. at 3259.
91. 104 S. Ct. at 3261.
92. Perhaps this is why O'Connor says that the Jaycees present a "relatively easy case for
application of the expressive-commercial dichotomy." 104 S. Ct. at 3261. The Jaycees
strongly object to the label "commercial." In its amicus brief, the Conference of Private Organizations, of which the Jaycees is a member, states: "[l]f the U.S. Jaycees is merely a commercial business, it hardly would have expended hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation
fees, in courts throughout the country, defending its purpose and right not to engage in the
allegedly lucrative 'sale' of memberships to women." Brief of Conference of Private Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affinnance at 12-13, Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Conference of Private
Organizations].
Judge Arnold, in his opinion for the Eighth Circuit, also considered and rejected describing
the Jaycees as a commercial association:
The Jaycees does not simply sell seats in some kind of personal-development classroom.
Personal and business development, if they come, come not as products bought by members, but as by-products of activities in which members engage after they join the organization. These activities are variously social, civic, and ideological, and some of them fall
within the narrowest view of the First Amendment freedom of association.
709 F.2d 1569.
The expressive activities of the Jaycees include the adoption of resolutions on a number of
political issues. These resolutions include support of a balanced budget, ''voluntary prayer in
American schools," and the economic development of Alaska. The national organization has
also taken stands in favor of the draft, the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty, and President Reagan's economic policies. It has opposed "socialized medicine," federal funds for
teachers' salaries, and pornography. 709 F.2d at 1569-70.
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Two major criticisms might be made of an approach in which a
line is drawn at a more-or-less arbitrary point and everything on one
side of the line is declared fully protected while everything on the
other side is left basically unprotected. Both criticisms concern what
happens near the line.
One criticism relates to the fact that two associations, concededly
similar in relevant respects, are subject to highly disparate treatment
when they fall close to, but on opposite sides of, the line between
expressive and commercial associations. This criticism, while not entirely without merit, is easily defended. Al/line-drawing requires the
acceptance of arbitrary distinctions at the margins, whether it be a
legislatively drawn line between 20- and 21-year-old consumers of
alcoholic beverages or a judicially drawn line between "predominantly" expressive associations and almost-predominantly expressive
associations.
The other criticism concerns the fact that dichotomous treatment
under the law often causes individuals or institutions to alter their
behavior in such a way as to receive the more favorable classification.93 Associations seeking constitutional protection for their restrictive membership policies will learn from the Jaycees' mistakes
and modify their activities. Associations will cease referring to members as "customers" and membership as the "product" they are selling. Awards will no longer be given to members selling the most
memberships. More organizational time will be devoted to taking
positions on public issues or engaging in other expressive activities. 94
A demurrer is the appropriate response to this criticism. No obvious
social evil flows from modifications of associational behavior of this
sort (in fact, it might be a social good). However, to the extent superficial changes (for example, in the choice of words used in a recruitment brochure) might produce a different classification, the
criticism does reflect upon the appropriateness of some of the criteria
used to classify associations as expressive or commercial.
On balance, the O'Connor approach seems to enjoy several distinct advantages over the majority approach. It leaves no doubt
about the power of the state to ensure equal access to commercial
93. For example, tax laws which deny favorable tax treatment to associations which engage in lobbying activities have prompted organizations such as the Sierra Club to reorganize
in such a way as to retain favorable tax treatment for those activities which are legally entitled
to it. See I.R.C. § S0l(c)(l982).
94. The Jaycees' practices of referring to memberships as "products," rewarding the re•
cruitment success of individual members, and devoting so much of its efforts to recruitment,
were cited by O'Connor as reasons for finding the Jaycees to be commercial. 104 S. Ct. at
3261.
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opportunities. It is more responsive to communitarian concerns in
that the organizations most important to the cultivation and transmittal of shared ideals and beliefs will be more fully protected
against intrusion. It is more predictable, more straightforward, and
more likely to produce incentives for positive action than the majority approach.
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF

lf.S.

JAYCEES

The long-term implications of ll.S. Jaycees are potentially enormous. Most directly affected, of course, are the thousands of private
associations in the United States which restrict membership on the
basis of sex, race, religion or some other characteristic arguably forbidden by state public accommodation statutes.95 Some of these associations, including the Boy Scouts and Rotary International, are
involved in litigation arising under public accommodation statutes.96
The decision in ll.S. Jaycees is likely to spawn more litigation as
other states, perhaps encouraged by Minnesota's success, attempt to
apply their public accommodation statutes to associations with discriminatory membership policies.97
95. Some private all-male associations include the Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks (1.6 million members), the Loyal Order of the Moose (1.3 million members), the Knights
of Pythias, the Improved Order of Red Men, the Lions Club, the Optimist Club, and the
Rotary Club. Other associations with restrictive membership policies include Knights of Columbus (male Catholics), Prince Hall Masonry (black males), Hadaassah (Jewish females),
B'nai B'rith Women (Jewish females), the National Association of Women's Clubs (black females), P.E.O. Sisterhood (all females), and the General Federation of Women's Clubs (all
females). In addition, many of the over 1,000 members of the National Club Association have
policies which restrict membership on the basis of race, sex or religion. Brief of Conference of
Private Organizations, supra note 92, at 2-11. This list is by no means exhaustive.
96. See, e.g., Curran v. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 147 Cal. App. 3d
712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S. June 26, 1984) (No.
83-1513)(holding that California's Civil Rights Act prohibits Boy Scouts from expelling member because of homosexuality); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Intl., 2d
Civ. No. BOO1663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dis.) (injunction sought preventing Rotary from enforcing its by-laws that restrict membership to males).
97. At least 38 states and many cities now have public acco=odation laws which prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, July 4, 1984, at l0A, col. 1.
Future targets of local public acco=odation laws are likely to be the discriminatory
membership policies of private local clubs. A New York City Council panel has approved a
bill, certain to become law, which defines as a public acco=odation a club that "has more
than 400 members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues,
fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf
of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business." N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1984, at IA,
col. 2. Religions and benevolent organizations are exempted by the bill which, according to a
lawyer for the New York State Club Association, might affect 30 or 40 institutions. Lois Whitman, general counsel of the City's Commission on Human Rights expects the constitutionality
of the law to be tested: "It's not going to be a breeze. We expect that it's going to be challenged." N.Y. Times, Sept 11, 1984, at B7, col. 3.
Whether a local public acco=odation law aimed at private clubs could be constitutionally enforced in a particular instance cannot be determined without a close examination of the
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National associations with restrictive membership policies are
faced with a choice. They may continue their discriminatory membership policies in the hope that either states will refrain from applying public accommodation statutes against them or, if enforcement is
attempted, that they will be able to defend themselves successfully in
court. Immediately after the decision in U.S. Jaycees was announced, spokespersons for at least two national associations with
all-male membership policies expressed confidence that their policies
would receive the constitutional protection withheld from the
Jaycees.98 Although it is probably too early to say for certain, this
may suggest that U.S. Jaycees will not result in a large number of
associations voluntarily abandoning discriminatory membership
policies.
The other option associations have is to do just that: to seize U.S.
Jaycees as an opportunity to reconsider the purpose and value of a
policy of excluding a particular class of persons, and then move to
open up membership. At least with respect to sex classifications, one
might guess - in view of the rapid rise in the public's sensitivity to
the consequences of gender-based discrimination - that many associations will choose that course. Still, it is interesting to note that
after women were admitted as members by its Minneapolis and St.
Paul chapters, the national membership of the Jaycees continued to
vote overwhelmingly to retain its all-male membership policy. In
1975, members voted down a proposal to open membership to
women by a margin of about ninety percent to ten percent. 99 However, the vote was dramatically different six weeks after the decision
in U.S. Jaycees was announced, when the Jaycees finally amended
their bylaws to allow the admission of women as full members. 100
membership policies and activities of the private club against which the ordinance is to be
applied. Justice Brennan's discussion of the "privacy" claim of associational freedom suggests
that a club with 400 or more members is unlikely to find privacy protection available. The
success of a first amendment based claim of associational freedom will depend upon analysis
of factors discussed in U.S. Jaycees:whether the club is selective and whether expressive activities constitute a significant part of the club's functions.
98. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, July 4, 1984, at IOA, cols. 3-4 (statements of David Park,
general counsel for the Boy Scouts of America, and Dr. Carlos Canseco, president of Rotary
International).
99. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 6, at 99 app. A proposal to allow individual chapters to set their own policies on female membership also lost. The vote on that proposal was
78% against, 22% in favor. Id
100. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at AS, cols. 1-2. The proposal to allow the admission of
women was approved on August 16, 1984 at the Jaycee's National Convention by a vote of
5,372 to 386, with 77 abstentions. Jaycees President Tommy Todd said of the vote that it was
an "opportune time" to set "a direction for others to follow."
The twelve-year legal fight to retain its restrictive membership policies had cost the Jaycees
approximately one million dollars. Id
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Two organizations with single-sex policies were singled out for
considerable discussion in the briefs, oral arguments, and written
opinions arising from the U.S. Jaycees litigation: the Kiwanis and
the Boy Scouts. 101 The attention given the Kiwanis resulted from a
suggestion by the Minnesota Supreme Court that that organization,
unlike the Jaycees, would not constitute a "public accommodation"
under Minnesota law. 102 The Boy Scouts, and to a lesser extent the
Girl Scouts and Cub Scouts, received attention because everyone except Minnesota's counsel in oral argument 103 - seemed anxious to
assure the Scouts that their single-sex membership policy was not in
serious jeopardy. 104
The Kiwanis International Organization, with 300,000 members
in 7,750 local chapters,1°5 is about as unselective in its membership
requirements as the Jaycees. 106 In fact, because the Kiwanis has no
upper age limit for membership, more men are eligible for membership in the Kiwanis than in the Jaycees. The Minnesota Supreme
Court's determination that the Jaycees, but not the Kiwanis, is a
"public accommodation" persuaded the Eighth Circuit to declare
that the Minnesota statute was void for vagueness. 107 The vagueness
challenge was rejected by the Supreme Court in what was probably
the least interesting portion of the U.S. Jaycees opinion. 108 What is
101. For references to the Kiwanis, see, e.g., 104 S. Ct. at 3256; 709 F.2d at 1577-78, 1582;
534 F. Supp. at 773; 305 N.W.2d at 771.
102. 305 N.W.2d at 771.
103. When asked by Justice O'Connor in oral argument whether the aggressive marketing
techniques of the Girl Scouts would make the Scouts a "public accommodation" under Minnesota law, Richard L. Varco, Jr., Minnesota's Special Assistant Attorney General, concluded
that it would. 52 U.S.L.W. 3785-86 (May 1, 1984).
104. In her opinion, O'Connor questioned whether Minnesota's law could be applied to
Scouts: "Even the training of outdoor survival skills or participation in community service
might become expressive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence,
patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement." 104 S. Ct. at 3259-60. A footnote to the abovecited remark makes reference to the handbooks of the Girl Scouts and the Boy Scouts. 104 S.
Ct. at 3260 n. •.
105. 709 F.2d at 1577.
106. The membership requirements of the Kiwanis International read in relevant parts:
Section 4. Active Membership
a. The active membership of this club shall consist of men of good character and community standing residing or having other community interests within the area of the club.
b. The active membership of this club shall be composed of a cross section of those who
are engaged in recognized lines of business, vocation, agriculture, institutional or professional life; or who having been so engaged, shall have retired. The number of members in
any one given classification shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the total active
membership.
709 F.2d at 1578.
107. 709 F.2d at 1578.
108. 104 S. Ct. at 3255-57. The Court viewed the Minnesota Supreme Court's distinction
between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis as making the statute more - not less - definite. The
distinction also was seen as undercutting the Jaycees' argument of unconstitutional over-
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interesting, however, is Brennan's hint that he, too, thinks that the
difference between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis might be significant
enough to qualify the latter organization's membership policy for
constitutional protection. 109 Brennan concludes that the record indicates that the Kiwanis is a private group that chooses its members on
the basis of "specific and selective criteria." 110 Legal scholarship has
been justly criticized for reading undue significance into offhand or
ambiguous passages in Supreme Court opinions, and it would certainly be reckless to conclude from a brief reference to the Kiwanis
that the principle enunciated in U.S. Jaycees is so narrow as to apply
only to the Jaycees, but one can hear the sighs of relief from attorneys for single-sex organizations.
Brennan's reference to the selectivity of the Kiwanis as a possible
ground for affording constitutional protection is susceptible to two
possible interpretations. The first is that selectivity provides a basis
for finding the Kiwanis to be an association protected under a fourteenth amendment privacy rationale. Only in discussing "freedom
of association" as a fundamental aspect of personal liberty was the
selectivity of an association specifically identified as a relevant factor, m yet an organization with the size and purpose of the Kiwanis
seems an unlikely candidate for privacy protection. The other interpretation is that selectivity is also relevant to analysis of a freedom of
association claim under the first amendment. Although selectivity arguably makes an association less commercial under the analysis used
by Justice O'Connor, why it should matter to Brennan is less clear.
The Brennan analysis focused on the interest of the state in ensuring
equality of access to association membership and on whether a
change of membership would affect the content of the association's
message. 112 Neither inquiry seems directly to implicate the selectivity
of membership criteria.
The inconsistencies and ambiguities in U.S. Jaycees may in one
sense serve the Court well. The Court has kept its options open.
Should it choose to do so, U.S. Jaycees could be extended to uphold
the application of anti-discrimination statutes to organizations as dibreadth because the limited construction of the statute reduced the risk that the statute would
be applied to a substantial amount of protected conduct.
109. 104 S. Ct. at 3256.
110. 104 S. Ct. at 3256. Brennan's characterization of the Kiwanis membership policy as
"selective" is questionable. See note 106 supra. It could, however, hardly help but be more
selective than the Jaycees' membership policy. No Jaycees membership applicant in Minnesota has ever been rejected. 305 N.W.2d at 771.
111. 104 S. Ct. at 3250-51.
112. 104 S. Ct. at 3252-55.
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verse as the Rotary International, the Girl Scouts, the Elks, or the
Sons of Norway. More probably, language in the opinion will be
used by courts to limit application of anti-discrimination statutes to a
handful of organizations which employ the Jaycees' unusually aggressive recruitment policies. In view of the uncertainties about the
ll.S. Jaycees analysis and the fact that three justices remain to be
heard from on the issues presented, a crude analysis of the decision
may well be the best analysis. The Jaycees is not primarily a social
group, its membership policies are very unselective, and expressive
activity is of relatively minor importance to the organization. A future case where any of those three factors is not present would be a
different case with a very good likelihood of producing a different
result.

V.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Americans have long been recognized as "the world's greatest
joiners." In the early nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville
wrote: "Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of
dispositions are forever forming associations. . . . of a thousand different types - religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very
limited, immensely large and very minute." 113 Although the reasons
Americans join associations are as bewildering in their variety as the
associations which they join, for many there is one overriding reason
for joining. An association can help restore an individual's self-identity and self-confidence, attributes which are continually eroded by
the anonymity, change and pace of life in our complex society. A
social association buttresses one's sense of identity simply by offering
a place to go ''where everybody knows your name; and they're always glad you came." 114 Associations with more of a political orientation strengthen the sense of identity of individual members by
offering the opportunity to have an impact on public policy far beyond that available to them as individuals - in a democracy it is
difficult for a person to achieve anything alone. 115
De Tocqueville viewed "freedom of association" as so fundamental as to have a source in natural law:
The most natural right of man, after that of acting on his own, is that
of combining his efforts with those of his fellows and acting together.
I 13. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 485 (G. Lawrence trans. 1966).
114. Portnoy & Angelo, Theme From "Cheers" (Where Everybody Knows Your Name), at 3
(Pamela Schultz big note color me series ed. 1983).
115. Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom ofAssociation, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
I, 12-13 (1977).
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Therefore the right of association seems to me by nature almost as inalienable as individual liberty. 116

In a nation where no significant public question is without its constitutional implications, it is not surprising that the "freedom of association" has emerged as the rallying cry. Those who find the
Constitution to reflect to an unacceptable degree the ethics of rightoriented liberalism see in "freedom of association" a protection directed to their concerns with the communal dimension of society. 117
The threat of egalitarianism substantially diminishing the cultural richness and pluralism of American society has grown in recent
years. Whatever cultural richness and pluralism might come from
allowing racial discrimination in housing, employment, education,
and access to commercial establishments was easily outweighed by
its cost to human dignity. All decent people understood this. Most
men would also willingly sacrifice a degree of associational freedom
in order to provide women with the same economic opportunities
that they have long enjoyed. When, however, a state acts to prohibit
private discrimination which does not reflect a mean-spiritedness toward the excluded group, the cost may be too much to pay. When
the last all-women's private school is forced to close its doors, when
the law no longer tolerates the existence of all-Norwegian or allCatholic clubs, when the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts finally
merge, even those of us calling ourselves egalitarians may stop to
shed a tear or two for pluralism lost.
It is important to realize that nothing strikes closer to the heart of
American pluralism than a law which tells an association who it
must accept as a member. The power to change the membership of
an association is "the power to change its purpose, its programs, its
ideology, and its collective voice." 118 It is a power so dangerous that
it should not be exercised even in many situations where it is believed that discrimination practiced by an association is wrong. As
Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in his
opinion in U.S. Jaycees, "[I]f, in the phrase of Justice Holmes, the
First Amendment protects 'the thought that we hate,' it must also, on
occasion, protect the association of which we disapprove." 119
The result in U.S. Jaycees was probably correct. The Minnesota
Supreme Court had found that the Jaycees functioned as a place of
public accommodation, and that finding was entitled to some defer116.
117.
118.
119.

DE TOCQUEVILLE,

supra note 113, at 178.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 701 (1978).

Appellee's Brief, supra note 22, at 13.
709 F.2d at 1561.
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ence. The Jaycees is not the type of association central to the communitarian ethic, and the admission of women to that organization
will not significantly diminish cultural richness and pluralism.
Moreover, the commercial nature of many of the Jaycees' activities
made its case for recognition of the principle of associational freedom particularly weak. For the next association threatened with
enforcement of a state anti-discrimination law, Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees provides little reason to despair of securing constitutional
protection.

